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A Public-key based Information
Management Model for Mobile Agents
Diego Rodr´ıguez and Igor Sobrado
Abstract— Mobile code based computing requires devel-
opment of protection schemes that allow digital signature
and encryption of data collected by the agents in untrusted
hosts. These algorithms could not rely on carrying encryp-
tion keys if these keys could be stolen or used to counterfeit
data by hostile hosts and agents. As a consequence, both
information and keys must be protected in a way that only
authorized hosts, that is the host that provides information
and the server that has sent the mobile agent, could modify
(by changing or removing) retrieved data. The data man-
agement model proposed in this work allows the information
collected by the agents to be protected against handling by
other hosts in the information network. It has been done
by using standard public-key cryptography modified to sup-
port protection of data in distributed environments with-
out requiring an interactive protocol with the host that has
dropped the agent. Their significance stands on the fact that
it is the first model that supports a full-featured protection
of mobile agents allowing remote hosts to change its own in-
formation if required before agent returns to its originating
server.
Keywords— Assurance, Asymmetric ciphers, Cryptogra-
phy, Data protection, Distributed networks, Information re-
trieval, Mobile agents.
I. Introduction
GLOBAL-NETWORKING and world-wide communi-cations are changing computing concepts as were es-
tablished some years ago. In the past, information was
stored in trusted hosts where data was managed. In that
case, it is easy to see that information security depends
on the protection of the hosts themselves. Protection of
hosts should be considered as a part of the operating sys-
tems design and not as an add-on. In fact, to ignore last
approach opens a wide variety of security holes in mod-
ern computer systems [1]. In any case, hosts protection
is more advanced that mobile code protection at present
time. Distributed computing requires information to be
managed in untrusted —and sometimes unknown— hosts
in the network; consequently, new data management mod-
els must be developed for distributed environments [2], [3],
[4]. Some protection schemes based in the use of Partial Re-
sult Authentication Codes (PRACs) ensures a perfect for-
ward integrity but does not assures backward integrity [5].
In these cases, the mobile agent carries the keys that will
be used to protect the messages. Each key could be applied
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to protect only one message being removed from the agent
data area after using. Even forward integrity could be
compromised. For example suppose that an agent follows
a route H = {H1,H2, . . . ,H
∗
i ,Hi+1, . . . ,Hj−1,H
∗
j , . . . ,Hn},
where both H∗i and H
∗
j , with i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and i < j,
are malicious hosts. The first hostile node in the route
of the agent, that is H∗i , could provide a copy of the keys
not removed from the mobile agent to the second mali-
cious host, H∗j . The second host could use this informa-
tion to counterfeit data provided by the hosts that apply
these keys. This fact makes all the hosts in the subset
H′ = {Hi+1,Hi+2, . . . ,Hj−1} ⊂ H vulnerable. The same
problem will happen if the agent returns to the first ma-
licious host later, showing that backward integrity cannot
be assured in any case.
The term message, as applied in this paper, stands for
each block of information provided by the remote hosts to
either other hosts or mobile agents. The word field identi-
fies a chunk of the message itself.
We want to note some differences that can be found be-
tween mobile agents, mobile code and intelligent agents, to
show in detail the problem that could be solved by using
the threat described in our work:
• Mobile agents. A mobile agent is a software object that
have a code area and a data part. Both code and data
areas will convey from a host to another one but the exe-
cution thread will not be preserved. Mobile agents could be
easily implemented by using serialization in programming
languages as Java.
• Mobile code. The most important difference between mo-
bile agents and mobile code is that the latter allows the
execution thread to be preserved when the agent goes from
one host to the next one. As the execution thread will be
changed in each host visited by the mobile code, to protect
this area is not easy.
• Intelligent agents. An intelligent agent is a software ob-
ject that have the ability of process information retrieved
autonomously. These agents does not require to be mobile.
Intelligent agents are an active field of study in artificial in-
telligence (AI) at present.
A given agent could be classified in more than one of the
groups described above. For example, a mobile agent could
be programmed in a way that allows it to decide the route
that it will follow by evaluating the information provided
by the peer (remote) hosts, making it both a mobile and
an intelligent agent simultaneously.
The threat we propose in our work allows an agent to be
protected against both malicious hosts and other agents.
These hosts and agents could try to make unauthorized
modifications on either the code area or the data space
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of the agent or even to remove the information provided
by other hosts. Our goal is to protect code and data ar-
eas against both counterfeit and erasing. Our technique
is based in the use of standard public-key encryption al-
gorithms —also known as asymmetric ciphers— instead of
symmetric ciphers. We will not propose nor recommend
the use of a specific cipher over others in our work.
We are not developing a protection algorithm for the
execution thread. The execution thread is changed by each
host where the mobile code arrives. As a consequence, it
cannot be easily protected without using a logging system.
In our opinion, encryption techniques could not be used to
provide full protection of mobile code.
II. Notational Conventions
In this section, we will introduce the notation used in
our work. This notation will be applied to describe digital
signature and encryption of data in both the agent server
and the peer hosts.
To describe the routes followed by the agents we will
define the setHr = {Hr1,H
r
2, . . . ,H
r
nr
}, where r = 1, 2, 3, . . .
and nr ∈ N; this set will denote the nr hosts followed by
the mobile agent released by a given agent server in its r-th
route. In this set, Hri , where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nr} and r ∈ N,
determines the i-th host in the r-th route followed by the
agent sent by the server S.
Digital signature—Digital signature of data can be used
to protect the information provided against counterfeit-
ing and erasing by allowing, at the same time, to be read
and authenticated by other hosts. It could be useful when
agents are used in negotiation processes between hosts. In
this case, only the private/public key pairs related with
the remote hosts are used to protect the data stored in the
agents allowing the information to be read and authenti-
cated by any host or agent without a knowledge of the
private-key used to digitally sign the message. We will de-
note the digital signature of any given message Mri,j using
the expression:
Sri,j
def
= fpri
Hr
i
[
Mri,j
]
, (1)
where Mri,j and S
r
i,j are the plain-text message and its sig-
nature respectively, priHr
i
identifies the private-key associ-
ated with the host Hri , and f stands for the digital signature
algorithm applied to protect the information provided by
the peer hosts against unauthorized modifications.
The message Mri,j can be authenticated by using the
public-key associated with the i-th host in the agent route
Hr. That public-key may be available to any host. The
security of the host Hri is not compromised by storing a
copy of that public-key in a public-key server. As we will
shown below, the use of certification authorities (CAs) to
authenticate the public-keys itself is highly recommended.
We must apply
Mri,j = f
−1
pubHr
i
[
Sri,j
]
= f−1pubHr
i
[
fpri
Hr
i
[
Mri,j
]]
, (2)
where Mri,j and S
r
i,j are the plain-text message and the digi-
tal signature of Mri,j again, pubHri stands for the public-key
associated with the host Hri and f
−1 identifies the digital
signature authentication algorithm.
Data encryption—A mobile agent based infrastructure
would require an additional security level. Suppose that
a server drops an agent that will retrieve information that
must be covered to any host in the network except the
server that has released the agent itself. In this case, data
encryption should be used to hide the information stored
in the agent data area. Data encryption requires the use of
an additional key pair, the private/public key pair related
with the agent server. Encryption of data requires the use
of the public-key provided by the agent server to the re-
mote hosts as a part of the mobile agent itself (pubS), and
the private-key associated with the remote host that pro-
vides information to the agent. We will show below that
the private/public key pair related with the server that has
released the agent cannot be counterfeited without invali-
dating the agent itself because it is a part of the code area.
We will define the encryption process as:
Cri,j
def
= fpub
S
[
fpri
Hr
i
[
Mri,j
]]
. (3)
In this case, Mri,j and C
r
i,j are the plain-text message and
its cipher-text respectively. The symbols pubS and priHr
i
in
equation (3) stand for the public-key related to the agent
server S and the private-key associated with the i-th host in
the r-th route followed by an agent dropped by the server
S respectively. In order to decrypt the cipher-text we must
use the private-key associated with the agent server (priS),
and the public-key provided by the peer host that has en-
crypted the message Mri,j :
Mri,j = f
−1
pub
Hr
i
[
f−1pri
S
[
Cri,j
]]
(4)
= f−1pub
Hr
i
[
f−1priS
[
fpub
S
[
fpri
Hr
i
[
Mri,j
]]]]
.
The elements that appear in equation (4) must be inter-
preted in the same way as shown in other equations in
this section. In this case, priS and pubS are, respectively,
the private and the public keys for the agent server; priHr
i
and pubHr
i
are the private and the public keys for the re-
mote host Hri . The message that has been covered by using
public-key cryptography is Mri,j , that is the j-th message
provided by the i-th host in the route followed by the agent,
and the cipher-text itself is Cri,j .
III. Code and Data Areas Protection
Classical protection schemes do not allow a mobile agent
to protect its own code area against unauthorized modifi-
cation easily. Suppose that a server digitally signs the code
of an agent before dropping it. This server must provide
copies of the public-key used to other hosts. This public-
key is required to authenticate the code area itself. This
can be done easily by providing a copy of this key to a key-
server or by using a CA. Obviously, the agent should be
instructed to get this key showing at least the address of
both the server that has released it and the host that stores
a copy of the key. At this moment a malicious host, let us
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say Hr,∗i , could change the agent code area and sign it by
using its own private/public key pair. It is not difficult to
prove that this modification will not be discovered by the
remote hosts if the code is changed in such a way that the
agent points to the new public-key. The hostile host only
needs to assure that the signed code area provided by the
agent server is recovered before the agent returns to the
server that has dropped it.
It is easy to see that code protection could not depend on
classical cryptography even if the keys used to authenticate
this area are certified and are provided by external trusted
authorities. We need to develop a way to link the data
provided by the peer hosts with the code part of the agent
at the same time. This will allow us to protect data and
code areas simultaneously.
Other protection threats have been proposed in recent
years. For example, the use of both code and data areas
mess up techniques as described in [2]. In this reference,
Hohl recommends the use of variable names that does not
means anything. He also proposed that the code should not
be modularized (i.e., it must be written without using sub-
routines) and to choose a data representation that makes
the program difficult to understand. This author proposed
the use of variable recomposition techniques, conversion of
compile-time control flow elements into run-time data de-
pendent jumps and the insertion of dead code, that is code
that will not be executed when the agent is running, into
the agents. These techniques are based in mixing up the
contents of the variables and creating new variables that
contains a few bits of data of some of the original variables.
These are recovered by changing the way the code of the
agent handles the access to the variables. Another alterna-
tive could be to develop a secure infrastructure for mobile
agents [5]. The use of encrypted functions1 and execution
environments (EE) with a fully separated interpreter2 has
been proposed in [6], [7]. At present, we do not have a way
of protecting the code against unauthorized modification
using encrypted functions because these techniques could
not be easily applied to real agent systems. We need pro-
tection schemes that do not rely on hiding the algorithms
used in code handling or on building trusted environments
for agent execution. Another problem is that the execution
of encrypted functions requires the development of one-way
homomorphic functions. These functions are unknown at
present.
In order to protect both the message provided by the
remote host, that we have denoted by Mri,j , and the mobile
1By using mathematical functions with homomorphic properties.
An example is the exponential function where the addition and mixed
multiplication between x, y ∈ C could be obtained without any ex-
plicit knowledge of x providing exp [x] instead of x in:
exp [x+ y] = exp [x] · exp [y]
exp [x · y] = (exp [x])y ,
allowing us to represent the encrypted program as a polynomial. An
important requeriment is that these functions should not be easily
inverted. At present, there are not known one-way homomorphic
functions.
2Where each agent have its own address space.
agent code area we propose that each host must obtain the
next field:
MrCRCi,j
def
= crc [pubS] + crc
[
fpri
S
[Mrcode]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
providedby the agent server S
+Fri,j , (5)
where fpri
S
[Mrcode] stands for the digital signature of the
code area Mrcode. The code area includes both the agent
code and an identification number (ID) for the agent.
Therefore, this identification number is unique because it
is generated from the agent server identificator, which is
unique in the network (for example the IP-address in IPv4
or IPv6 format of the agent server itself), and an agent
number, which is unique for that server. In our case, we will
obtain ID = serverID + agentID. Obviously, fpriS [M
r
code]
could not be evaluated in the remote hosts. To obtain this
field, a knowledge of the private-key associated with the
server that has dropped the agent (priS) is required. This
field must be provided as a part of the agent in a way that
cannot be falsified. To manage it, a field Fri,j must be added
by the host Hri to the field M
r
CRCi,j
shown in equation (5).
This field must change with each message provided in a way
that it is unique for that host/agent pair. The code part
must be authenticated by comparing its digital signature
with the signature carried by the agent by each peer host
before accepting it. The cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of
both the public-key associated with the agent server and
the signature of the agent code in (5) can be obtained by
each remote host by using a hash algorithm. This informa-
tion must be matched with the CRCs of both the public-key
of the agent server and the digital signature provided as a
part of the data area.
In this section the term improved (as appears in both
improved digital signature and improved data encryption)
stands for digital signature and encryption processes that
include information about the mobile agent code area. In
fact, information about the code part of the agent will be
included by each peer host in the field MrCRCi,j , as shown
in equation (5), allowing remote hosts to detect unautho-
rized modifications of the code part of the agents. Partial
data encryption will also provide a signed copy of the field
MrCRCi,j . In this case, both the field M
r
CRCi,j
and the mes-
sage Mri,j will be digitally signed but only the message M
r
i,j
itself will be encrypted, allowing each host to detect code
tampering but protecting information against reading by
unauthorized hosts at the same time.
Improved digital signature—In our opinion it is possible
to protect both the agent code area and the information
provided by the host itself simultaneously. To manage it,
the field MrCRCi,j must be used. This field must be stored
as a part of each message provided to the mobile agents
before being digitally signed:
Sri,j = fpriHr
i
[
MrCRCi,j +M
r
i,j
]
; (6)
this step assures data integrity while avoiding the possibil-
ity to overwrite a new message provided by a remote host
with an old one provided to another mobile agent in the
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past. The information protected in this way is authenti-
cated by applying the public-key pubHr
i
of the host that
has signed it:
MrCRCi,j +M
r
i,j = f
−1
pub
Hr
i
[
Sri,j
]
(7)
= f−1pub
Hr
i
[
fpri
Hr
i
[
MrCRCi,j +M
r
i,j
]]
.
Improved data encryption—The information about the
code area of the mobile agent obtained by using (5) will
be added to the message provided by the remote host. To
encrypt a message for the agent server we must apply the
next algorithm to the message itself:
Cri,j = fpubS
[
fpri
Hr
i
[
MrCRCi,j +M
r
i,j
]]
. (8)
In order to recover the full message, MrCRCi,j + M
r
i,j , the
agent server should apply its own private-key, priS, and
the public-key provided by the host that has encrypted the
message, pubHr
i
, obtaining:
MrCRCi,j +M
r
i,j = f
−1
pubHr
i
[
f−1pri
S
[
Cri,j
]]
. (9)
The main disadvantage of this method is that the code can
be counterfeited in such a way that only the agent server
knows that it has been falsified. If a part of Cri,j is not
encrypted, but is digitally signed, all the hosts in the route
of the agent will have a way to determine whether the code
area or other data in the agent have been falsified by any
host.
Partial data encryption—A better answer to the prob-
lem of data encryption is to provide information publically
about the CRC of both the public-key related with the
agent server (pubS) and the signature of the agent code,
fpri
S
[Mrcode]. It is possible to do it and, at the same time,
to hide the message in such a way that only the authorized
host (the agent server) could decrypt it. We propose to
partially encrypt a digitally signed message using:
Cri,j = fpriHr
i
[
MrCRCi,j + fpubS
[
Mri,j
]]
; (10)
assuring that the code area cannot be changed by a mali-
cious host because each one can authenticate the CRC of
the digital signature, provided by the agent server using
(5), and the public-key of that server simultaneously. This
information can be verified by any host but the message
Mri,j can only be decrypted using the private-key of the
agent server, priS. We propose to apply the next set of
equations to check the code and data areas of the agent
and decrypt the message:
MrCRCi,j + fpubS
[
Mri,j
]
= f−1pubHr
i
[
Cri,j
]
(11)
Mri,j = f
−1
priS
[
fpub
S
[
Mri,j
]]
. (12)
The former equation (11) can be used by any host because
the public-key related with the i-th host in the r-th route
followed by an agent sent by the server S (pubHr
i
) is avail-
able publically to all the hosts that need it. This equation
will be required to check data and code integrity at the
same time. Equation (12) is applied by the agent server
using its own private-key, priS, to decrypt the information
provided by the host Hri , after checking the cipher-text by
applying (11).
IV. Public-key Propagation
One of the main goals of our work is to provide a threat
that allows mobile agents to be protected against attacks
like those described in Section V-A. We propose to use
public-key ciphers, also known as asymmetric cryptosys-
tems, instead of symmetric ciphers because the latter al-
lows a simplified key management in distributed environ-
ments. Public-keys can be shared between hosts in a net-
work without requiring secure communication channels like
these obtained using, for example, the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol. Detailed information about the
TLS protocol can be found in [8], [9].
Some important requeriments must be considered in the
development of a public-key propagation infrastructure for
mobile agents:
• Certification authorities. It is easy to see that uncertified
public-keys cannot be trusted. It is not a good practice to
send keys directly to the servers that need them. We need
a network infrastructure that allows the nodes to assure
what host owns each private/public key pair. For exam-
ple middleman attack, the greatest known vulnerability of
public-key based ciphers, can be avoided by using a trusted
third party to verify and sign the keys transmitted over the
network.
• Non-interactive protocol. As pointed out it [6] a security
model for mobile agents should conceive protocols that re-
quire minimal interaction between the agent and the server
that has sent it. The server may want to go off-line, conse-
quently, the public-key should be provided by an indepen-
dent host. Our threat allows the public-key related with
the agent server (pubS) to be provided as a part of the
agent.
Our threat to protect mobile agents offers some impor-
tant advantages too.
• Secure communication channels are not required. This is
a common advantage of public-key cryptography. As only
public-keys are transmitted over the network untrusted
communication channels can be established to share the
keys. These keys cannot be used to falsify information or
decrypt data provided to the agents.
• We do not need to know what host owns each public-key.
Obviously, this fact is only true if different access privileges
are not assigned to each agent in function of the server that
has released it. If different access permissions are required
CAs must be used to authenticate the keys provided to the
remote hosts and to assign the right access privileges to
each agent server.
Certified public-keys are required even if different access
permissions are not assigned to mobile agents in function
of the server that has dropped it. In fact, each peer host
must identify other hosts in the network in soon a way that
it does not allows host impersonation techniques. Trusted
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third parties are needed to avoid well known threats like
the middleman attack. We must consider that changing
the public-keys carried by mobile agents —the public-keys
associated with the agents servers— will invalidate data
retrieved by the agents. If the information stored in the
mobile agent data area is removed from the agent when
this public-key is falsified other hosts will not have a way
to determine that the agent have been modified without
authorization. But this fact will be discovered by the agent
server after the agent return. These keys does not require
to be authenticated using a CA. Changing public-key for a
given agent must be avoided once they have been provided
to the route servers (RSs).
As we noted in Section III, both code and data areas
can be protected against counterfeiting and erasing by ma-
licious hosts and agents. This can be achieved by adding a
field MrCRCi,j to each message retrieved by a mobile agent
as presented in (5). This field, MrCRCi,j , will provide in-
formation about both the code part of the agent and the
public-key of its originating server. This field will be stored
in such a way that it does not allow changing the code of
the agent without invalidating it.
Each agent have its own ID to avoid the possibility of
overwriting the information provided by peer hosts with old
data retrieved by other agents sent by the same server. This
field is stored as a part of the code area. As a consequence,
crc
[
fpri
S
[Mrcode]
]
changes when new agents are dropped.
Even obsolete information provided to the same agent in
the past cannot be used to cover new data. Each host must
generate a field, we called Fri,j , unique for each message. All
these fields should be sent to the RSs:
Fri = ID + F
r
i,1 + F
r
i,2 + . . .+ F
r
i,mr
i
= ID +
mri∑
j=1
Fri,j , (13)
where ID is the agent identification number mentioned
above. The field Fri must be sent to RSs digitally signed
by applying:
Srfieldsi = fpriHr
i
[Fri ] , (14)
using the private/public key pair for the host that provides
that information. Any host can check each message pro-
vided by Hri by using the F
r
i,j fields, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nr}
and j = 1, 2, . . . ,mri , stored in F
r
i . Those fields must be
authenticated by using:
Fri = f
−1
pub
Hr
i
[
Srfieldsi
]
= f−1pub
Hr
i
[
fpri
Hr
i
[Fri ]
]
. (15)
To assure the integrity of the message Fri each RS should
send a random message to the host that wants to provide
a new (or an updated) message Fri . This random message
must be digitally signed and returned to the RS that re-
leased it. The random message signature must be checked
before the RS accepts Fri . In other case, a malicious host
can provide an obsolete message Fr,∗i to the RSs overwrit-
ing the mobile agent data area with old information corre-
sponding to the false message Fr,∗i simultaneously.
V. Attacks against Mobile Agents
Infrastructures
In this section we classify the attacks that is possible
to try against the mobile agents and other hosts in the
network. We show how our protection threat allows us to
protect the agents and, in some cases, even remote hosts
against these attacks.
A. Attacks against Mobile Agents
The main goal of our investigation is to protect the mo-
bile agents against both malicious hosts and other agents
that can counterfeit the code part and/or data areas of the
agents. These hostile agents and hosts can try to remove
information carried by the agents too. As noted, these at-
tacks could arrive from both other agents and the hosts
where the agents are stored. In both cases, we will protect
the agent using the same threat.
A.1 Attacks against the Code Part
As we shown in Section III the agent code area can be
protected by adding two CRCs to each message provided
by the peer hosts. These CRCs provides information that
allows peer hosts to authenticate both the public-key as-
sociated with the agent server and the digital signature of
the code area of the agent, that has been provided by the
agent server itself. These fields must be matched with each
message stored in the data area by the hosts followed in the
agent trip, as appears in the set Hr. At last, each host au-
thenticates the code area of the agent too before running
it using that digital signature previously checked. As both
the CRC related with the digital signature of the code area
and the CRC for the public-key of the agent server cannot
be changed during agent trip, but the latter is unique for a
given agent, data area is protected at the same time. As a
consequence, the attacks described below can be avoided.
A.2 Attacks against the Data Area
The attacks against the information carried by mobile
agents can be classified in three groups: (i) attacks trying
to erase data carried by the agents (also known as a mobile
agent “brainwashing” in bibliography), (ii) attacks trying
to falsify data provided by other hosts and (iii) attacks
trying to uncover non-public information carried by the
agents.
Removing information—To avoid a mobile agent “brain-
wash” each host must provide information about the num-
ber of messages stored in a particular agent to the RSs
as we described in Section IV. It is easy to see that all
the information needed to protect the data area cannot be
stored in the agent. Suppose for example that a mobile
agent carries a set of signed messages
Dr = {Sr1,1, S
r
1,2, . . . , S
r
1,mr
1
, Sr2,1, S
r
2,2, . . . , S
r
2,mr
2
, . . . ,
Sri,1, S
r
i,2, . . . , S
r
i,j , . . . , Si,mri , . . . ,
Srnr ,1, S
r
nr,2
, . . . , Srnr,mrnr
} , (16)
in its data area. The set Dr in (16) stands for the signed
data area of the r-th agent released by a server. All the
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messages are signed in a way that only the hosts that has
provided these messages can change its contents. If the RSs
do not provides information about the number of messages
given by each host to the agent server or, more generally to
other hosts that requests it, any hostile node (any malicious
host in the network) can remove a message, let us say Sri,j
where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nr} identifies the host that provides
the message removed and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,mri } stands for the
j-th message provided by that host. In this case, the set of
messages carried by the agent, Dr, is changed to
Dr,∗ = {Sr1,1, S
r
1,2, . . . , S
r
1,mr
1
, Sr2,1, S
r
2,2, . . . , S
r
2,mr
2
, . . . ,
Sri,1, S
r
i,2,
∧
S
r
i,j
. . . , Si,mr
i
, . . . ,
Srnr ,1, S
r
nr,2
, . . . , Srnr,mrnr
} ,
without invalidating the data area. In this case, the setDr,∗
is the falsified data area of the agent. The same problem
happens when encryption is used if the number of messages
carried by a mobile agent is not provided to the RSs in any
way. In this case the encrypted data area of the agent:
Dr = {Cr1,1,C
r
1,2, . . . ,C
r
1,mr
1
,Cr2,1,C
r
2,2, . . . ,C
r
2,mr
2
, . . . ,
Cri,1,C
r
i,2, . . . ,C
r
i,j , . . . ,Ci,mri , . . . ,
Crnr ,1,C
r
nr,2
, . . . ,Crnr,mrnr
} , (17)
can be modified by removing one of the cipher-texts pro-
vided by the remote hosts. For example, the cipher-text
that corresponds to the j-th message provided by the i-th
host in the agent route can be erased by changing the agent
data area to:
Dr,∗={Cr1,1,C
r
1,2, . . . ,C
r
1,mr
1
,Cr2,1,C
r
2,2, . . . ,C
r
2,mr
2
, . . . ,
Cri,1,C
r
i,2,
∧
C
r
i,j
. . . ,Ci,mr
i
, . . . ,
Crnr ,1,C
r
nr,2
, . . . ,Crnr,mrnr
} .
Even if information about the number of messages carried
by the agent is provided in a way that an hostile peer host
cannot change it, data area can be altered by overwriting
it with a bit-copy of an old data area.
To avoid attacks based in the techniques described above
we propose to send information about the number of mes-
sages provided to the agent to the RSs shown in the code
area of the mobile agent itself. These hosts cannot be
changed without invalidating the agent itself. A copy of
the fields Fri,j , as shown in equation (5), is all the informa-
tion needed to manage it; in fact, these fields are required
to authenticate data provided by each host visited by the
mobile agent as shown above.
Counterfeit of data— Even if data have been digitally
signed or encrypted information provided can be falsified.
As noted above, data area can be protected against “brain-
washing” by storing information about the amount of mes-
sages provided by each host visited by the agent in sep-
arated hosts. We need a way to protect the information
provided by peer hosts to the agent against being over-
written with old signed data provided by those hosts in
the past. In Section III we propose to link data provided
as a part of the agent, the fields in MrCRCi,j as shown in
(5), with each messages retrieved by the agent. If this field
is not included any hostile host can change the data area
of the agent as appears in (16), overwriting a valid signed
message Mri,j with an old message signed by the same host
using the same private/public key pair, let us say Mr,∗i,j :
Dr,∗ = {Sr1,1, S
r
1,2, . . . , S
r
1,mr
1
, Sr2,1, S
r
2,2, . . . , S
r
2,mr
2
, . . . ,
Sri,1, S
r
i,2, . . . , S
r,∗
i,j , . . . , Si,mri , . . . ,
Srnr ,1, S
r
nr,2
, . . . , Srnr,mrnr
} .
The same problem happens with encrypted messages if the
field MrCRCi,j , obtained by applying (5), is not provided as
a part of the messages. In this case, the encrypted data
area of the mobile agent in (17) can be counterfeited by
changing one of the cipher-texts provided by the remote
hosts, for example the message Cri,j can be changed to C
r,∗
i,j :
Dr,∗={Cr1,1,C
r
1,2, . . . ,C
r
1,mr
1
,Cr2,1,C
r
2,2, . . . ,C
r
2,mr
2
, . . . ,
Cri,1,C
r
i,2, . . . ,C
r,∗
i,j , . . . ,Ci,mri , . . . ,
Crnr ,1,C
r
nr,2
, . . . ,Crnr ,mrnr
} .
To avoid information provided by peer hosts to be overwrit-
ten by using a bit-copy with old signed data obtained in
the same trip we propose to add another field to MrCRCi,j .
This field is introduced in Section III. Each host can pro-
vide a field in each message. We denoted this field as Fri,j .
This field is changed when the remote host wants to sign
or encrypt a new message for the agent. This field will
be provided to the RSs and must be matched against the
copies stored in Fri,j by each host that wants to check data
and code integrity. Each host visited by the agent provides
a set of fields Fri,j , where j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
r
i to the RSs as
presented in (13).
Cryptanalysis—In our work we propose to protect data
provided by using standard cryptographic techniques that
can be attacked by using cryptanalysis3. We are not mak-
ing assumptions about the encryption algorithms used to
cover data nor the keys length that may vary in function
of the security requirements. As noted in [10], the fact
that public-key based ciphers allows predictable patterns
to survive the encryption process making this technology
vulnerable to cryptanalysis is well known to cryptanalysts;
as a consequence, standard compression techniques should
be applied before encryption to increase data security.
Middleman attack— The man-in-the-middle attack is
probably the greatest known vulnerability of asymmetric
cryptosystems. Mobile agent based infrastructures can be
attacked by using a middleman attack variant. In this case,
a malicious host will intercept both the public-key send to
the RSs by the remote host and the agent itself. This host
will generate a private/public key pair to falsify data pro-
vided by that host and provide a copy of the false public-
key to the RSs. To avoid the attacks based on this threat
the use of CAs to verify and sign the keys used by the hosts
to protect its own data is recommended.
3Two powerful techniques to attack ciphers, known as differential
and linear cryptanalysis, were elaborated and are being currently
used. The former was developed by Adi Shamir and Eli Biham of
Technion Israel Institute of Technology. The latter was introduced
by Mitsuru Matsui of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
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A.3 Attacks against the Agents itself
The mobile agents can be attacked in a way that do not
require to modify either the code area or the data part
of the agents. The main goal of these attacks can be to
damage the agent infrastructure itself by destroying the
agents or releasing new agents instead of the original one.
Removing agents—Any malicious host can remove the
agents when arrive to it. There are no-way to avoid this
attack against the agents but or protection threat allows
other host to try to discover what host has killed the agent
by requesting information about the route followed by the
agent.
Releasing new agents—A hostile host can remove all the
information stored in the mobile agent and change the code
area. Modifying the code area requires gathering a fake pri-
vate/public key pair for the agent server but now it is possi-
ble because all the MrCRCi,j fields have been removed from
the data area of the agent. The new private/public key
pair can be used to sign a modified code area of the agent.
This fact can be discovered, at least, by the server that
has released the agent when it comes back. If other hosts
have a copy of the public-key of the agent server, either ob-
tained by other channels or sent in the past, these hosts can
discover the unauthorized modification of the agent too.
B. Attacks against Peer Hosts
Our goal is to protect mobile agents against attacks from
both peer hosts and other agents. We are not trying to
develop a threat to protect hosts against malicious agents.
Attacks against remote hosts could be initiated from both
agents and hosts.
The code area protection allows an agent to be protected
against malicious changes that could affect how it works.
At the same time, the code protection allows a host to
be protected against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by
agent cloning in the sense that the number of clones could
be easily verified by using the agent identification number
described above. This allows a host to protect itself by
controlling the resources provided to the agents in a per-
agent basis. The agent identification number allows a host
to identify the number of clones of a given agent.
The code protection threat proposed in our work do not
permits a hostile host to change the code part of an agent
provided by an agent server without invalidating it but,
obviously, this host could release its own malicious agents.
VI. Conclusions
Mobile agents are an extremely vulnerable piece of soft-
ware because they are executed in untrusted environments.
Both code and data areas must be protected against ma-
licious hosts and agents. The former requires techniques
that does not allow a malicious host to hide the identity
of the real agent owner. The latter requires information
provided by remote hosts to be protected against counter-
feit and erasing. The main advantages of the algorithm
proposed in this paper are that:
• Secure communication channels are not required allowing
a mobile agent to be transmitted over untrusted channels
and even stored in malicious hosts where the agent will be
shown as plain-text even if trusted communication channels
between hosts are established.
• Both code and data areas are protected against counter-
feit and erasing; consequently, mobile agents are a more
secure and robust platform.
• Each host could change its own information when re-
quired. This allows a host to update information provided
permitting the development of more sophisticated agent-
based applications, where negotiation between agents and
hosts is required.
We hope that our protection scheme allows mobile agent
based infrastructures to be protected against other attacks
based on threats not covered in this article or even unknown
at present. If this can be achieved, our threat could be a
good design principle for mobile agent based information
networks.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Dr. Agust´ın Nieto,
Dr. Jose´ Manuel Noriega and Dr. M. A´. R. Osorio for
reviewing the draft of the article, recommend us the use
of the notation proposed by the American Mathematical
Society (AMS) in this work and provide us a place to work.
Without their many helpful comments this work would not
be possible.
References
[1] Dennis M. Ritchie, On the Security of UNIX, Unix Program-
mer’s Manual. A. G. Hume and M. D. McIlroy, AT&T Bell Lab-
oratories, Murray Hill, N. J., June 1977.
[2] Fritz Hohl, “An approach to solve the problem of malicious
hosts in mobile agents systems,” Institute of Parallel and
Distributed High-Performance Systems (IPVR), University of
Stuttgart, Germany, vol. 1997, no. 03, pp. 1–13, March 1997.
[3] Tomas Sander and Christian F. Tschudin, “Protecting mobile
agents against malicious hosts,” Lecture Notes in Computer
Science (LNCS), Springer-Verlag Inc., New York, NY, USA,
vol. 1419, June 1998.
[4] Igor Sobrado, A One-Time Pad based Cipher for Data Pro-
tection in Distributed Environments, [Online], Computing
Research Repository (CoRR), arXiv:cs.CR/0005026, Available:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/cs.CR/0005026, May 2000.
[5] Bennet S. Yee, “A sanctuary for mobile agents,” Secure Inter-
net Programming, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS),
Springer-Verlag Inc., vol. 1603, pp. 261–274, 1999.
[6] Tomas Sander and Christian F. Tschudin, “Towards mobile
cryptography,” International Computer Science Institute (ICSI)
Technical Report, vol. 97, no. 049, pp. 1–14, November 1997.
[7] Christian F. Tschudin, “Intelligent Information Agents — Agent
based information discovery and management on the Internet,”
in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Springer-Verlag
Inc., New York, NY, USA, M. Klusch, Ed., July 1999, pp. 431–
445.
[8] T. Dierks and C. Allen, “The TLS protocol: Version 1.0,” Re-
quest for Comments, , no. 2246, pp. 1–80, January 1999.
[9] Lawrence C. Paulson, “Inductive analysis of the Internet pro-
tocol TLS,” ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 332–351, August 1999.
[10] Philip R. Zimmermann, “Cryptography for the Internet,” Sci-
entific American, vol. 279, no. 4, pp. 82–87, October 1998.
